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Webb: Social Security Benefits

NOTE

CRAWFORD v. GOULD: FEDERAL STATUTE
GIVES FINANCIAL BOON TO STATE
INSTITUTIONALIZED PSYCHIATRIC
PATIENTS

I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Gould, the Ninth Circuit held that the
State of California may not take Social Security benefits from
a recipient without his or her consent. 1 The court found that
federal law preempted California's procedure of applying the
Social Security benefits of unconsenting institutionalized patients to the cost of their care. 2 With this decision, the Ninth
Circuit ruled California's procedure invalid. 3
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
California law holds patients committed to state psychiatric hospitals liable for the cost of their "care, support, and
maintenance."4 Upon commitment to a California hospital,
each patient receives a statement of pending liability for the
cost of services provided by the state. 5 The state then conducts
individual financial investigations to determine how much each
patient can afford to pay for care costs. 6 Hospitals use this in1. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1995) (per Tang, J., joined
by Schroeder, J., Trott, J.; per Trott, J., concurring).
2. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1163.
3. [d. at 1166.
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7275 (West 1981).
5. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1995).
6. [d. at 1164. The Client Financial Services branch of the California Depart-
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formation to establish a monthly billing procedure for each
patient. 7
California law also requires that each state psychiatric
hospital establish and maintain trust accounts in which it
must place all funds patients have at admission and any they
receive while institutionalized. s These funds include federal
Social Security Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits. 9
When assets in an individual patient's fund exceed $500, the
hospital draws a payment to cover the costs of that patient's
care. lO This process begins shortly after admission, when each
patient is asked to sign an authorization form allowing the
hospital to deposit into, and withdraw from, the trust ac-:
count. l l Regardless of whether a patient signs the authoriza-

ment of Developmental Services makes this determination. Id.
7. Id.
8. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7281 (West 1981). These funds are known as
"Patients' Personal Deposit Fund[sl." Id.
9. Crawford; 56 F.3d at 1164.
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7281 (West 1981).
11. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1164. The "Authorization for Deposit and Withdrawal" provides in part:
I understand that State law requires the deposit
into my Personal Deposit Fund of all moneys in my possession at the time of my admission to a state hospital . . . and any other funds received by or for me during
my residence at such a state facility. These funds so
deposited may have originated from any private or public
source, including such federal agencies as the Social Security Administration and/or the Veterans Administration.
[Dlisbursements from my Personal Deposit Fund
may be made by the Trust Officer on my behalf for my
care and maintenance, treatment services, clothing, personal purchases and other necessities and incidentals.
I hereby authorize all such deposits to and withdrawals from my Personal Deposit Fund.
I further understand that federal laws dealing with
Social Security or Veterans Administration payments exempt these benefits from legal or equitable claim processes so they will be available for the purpose of assuring
my care, maintenance and medical treatment. This Authorization for the use of these benefits is specifically for
these stated purposes.
Id.
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tion, the hospital deposits and withdraws funds from the
patient's account. 12
Several of the named plaintiffs in Crawford v. Gould refused to give, or revoked, their authorizations to California's
deduction process. 13 Nonetheless, the state deducted care
costs from these patients' funds. 14 These patients then filed a
class action suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin the
Secretary of the California Health and Welfare Agency from
taking funds from class members' trust accounts. 15 On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
partial relief to the plaintiffs.16 The court enjoined California
from withdrawing patients' Social Security benefits without
patient consent, and concluded that federal law preempts this
practice. 17

12. [d. "Each hospital provides nonconsenting patients with a 'Notice of Intended Withdrawal,' which informs the patient of the amount the hospital will be
withdrawing monthly from the patient's trust account." [d.
13. [d. at 1164. Of the six named plaintiffs, at least five refused to sign or
revoked authorization. The court failed to provide this information about the sixth
named plaintiffs actions. [d.
14. See id.
15. [d. at 1163-65. The class was defined as follows:
All current and future patients involuntarily hospitalized in a California state psychiatric hospital who receive funds at the hospital which are deposited in the
patient's personal deposit fund at the hospital, and for
whom funds on deposit have been or are subject to being
applied as payments toward the costs of the patient's care
and treatment at the hospital.
All members of the class who receive Social Security benefits for whom the State is not the representative
payee are members of a sub-class, which is defined as
follows:
All current and future patients involuntarily hospitalized in a California state psychiatric hospital who receive Social Security benefits which are deposited in the
patient's personal deposit fund, for whom these funds
have been or are subject to being applied as payments
towards the costs of the patient's care and treatment at
the hospital.
[d. Although the district court opinion has not been published, this class is defined
in Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1163 n.l.
16. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165.
17. [d. The district court based its preemption determination on 42 U.S.C. §
407(a) (1994). [d. See infra note 28 and accompanying text for statutory language.
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The district court also held that the notice California provided before withdrawing any funds from patients' accounts
was inadequate and violated procedural due process requirements. 18 The court enjoined California from withdrawing
funds without adequate notice and ordered the state to change
its notice procedure. 19 The State then appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. 20
III. BACKGROUND
A cursory knowledge of Social Security benefits is integral
to understanding the application of Social Security
nonassignment law in Crawford. 21 This section traces the
development of Social Security nonassignment law, defines
Social Security and explains how the Social Security Act's
nonassignment statute affects this area of law. 22
A. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

Social Security is a program of federal payments designed
to provide some protection to workers and their families
against loss of earnings due to retirement, disability, or
death. 23 The Social Security statute defines "disability" as an
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity because

18. [d.

19. [d. The district court ordered California to inform patients:
a) of the proposed share of cost and the facts on
which the determination was made;
b) that the plaintiff has a right to appeal the share
of cost determination;
c) a description of the appeal process and procedure; and
d) that certain federal benefits, specifically Social
Security benefits and Veterans benefits, are exempt from
legal process and cannot be used to pay the plaintiff's
cost of care without the patient's knowing, affirmative and
unequivocal consent.
[d.
20.
21.
U.S.C.
22.
23.
(1979);

Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165.
See Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1161, 1165-67 (9th Cir. 1995). See also 42
§§ 301-1397, for statutory law controlling Social Security benefits.
See infra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
ARTHUR ABRAHAM AND DAVID L. KOPELMAN, FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY 4
See also 42 U.S.C. § 423 (West Supp. 1995).
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of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
that will last at least twelve months, or until death. 24 This
definition qualifies a wide variety of people with assorted disabilities to receive Social Security benefits.25 A subclass of the
plaintiffs in Crawford had qualified under this definition, and
were eligible to receive Social Security benefits.26
B. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT'S N ONASSIGNMENT PROVISION

1. Introduction
In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act's
Nonassignment Provision (hereinafter "SSANP,,).27 In relevant
part, this section provides that "[t]he right of any person to
future payment [of Social Security funds is not] transferable or
assignable [or] subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.,,28
The SSANP generally protects Social Security recipients'
benefits from unconsented attachment by a state governmental
entity.29 The Supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-

24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Irwin v. Shalala, 840 F. Supp. 751, 761-70 (D. Or. 1993) (chronic
fatigue syndrome); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 955-59 (9th Cir. 1993) (back
pain); Donahue v. Shalala, 851 F. Supp. 27, 29-34 (D. Conn. 1994) (post-traumatic
stress disorder); Holden v. Shalala, 846 F. Supp. 662, 664-70 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (obesity).
26. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1163 n.!.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1994) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c.
531, Title II, § 207, 49 Stat. 624).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (a). In whole, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides:
The right of any person to any future payment
under this title shall not be transferable or assignable, at
law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable
or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.
42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
29. See King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1991) (state may not
threaten to sue for Social Security benefits to pay for patient recipient's care) cert.
denied 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1990)
(holding that special proceeding provided for by state law was unconstitutional as
"legal process" to obtain Social Security benefits as payment for institutional care);
Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 322, 328 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that § 407(a)
is violated if state places itself in position as preferred creditor or coerces payment
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tion mandates that federal law prevails over any conflicting
state law. 30 Therefore, when a state has a statute or procedure allowing it to take a recipient's benefits without his or
her consent, as California's procedure did with state psychiatric patients, the SSANP will control, and the recipient's
benefits may not be taken. 31
The state attachment will be prohibited unless a jurisdiction finds there is an implied exception to the SSANP's language. 32 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal
have ruled that an implied exception to the SSANP's language
exists. 33 These courts held that, under certain circumstances,
a recipient's benefits may be taken without his or her consent. 34
2. Overview of Nonassignment Case Law
A number of courts interpreted and applied the SSANP
before it became an issue in Crawford. 35 A summary of some

of Social Security benefits); Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 265-66 (9th Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (holding that state reimbursement procedures conflicted with §
407(a) and must be struck down); Woodall v. Bartolino, 700 F. Supp. 210, 220
(D.N.J. 1985) (holding that state or its courts cannot compel a Social Security
beneficiary's payee to use funds for recipient care costs, but should try to seek
remedy from Social Security District Office under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2041, 404.2050,
416.601(a)(20».
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397
(1988) (holding that Arkansas statute was in conflict with § 407; "a conflict that
the State cannot win.").
31. See supra note 29.
32. See e.g. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th
Cir. 1991). See also infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
33. See id.. See also Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis,
616 F.2d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 1980). See also infra notes 54-75 and accompanying
text.
34. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. See also infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988) (per curiam) (the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewing Arkansas statute that sought recipient prisoners' Social
Security funds to defray costs of incarceration); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare
Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (the U.S. Supreme Court reviewing New Jersey procedure
of seeking reimbursement after recipient received state assistance on condition that
he would reimburse state agency); King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1991)
(appellate court reviewing Missouri's forcing of insanity acquittees' payees to use
Social Security benefits for cost of patients' care) cert. denied 502 U.S. 1095 (1991);
Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1991) (appellate court reviewing state of
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of these courts' rulings using the SSANP, illustrating the current state of SSANP law, follows.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed a state's
access to a recipient's benefits in 1973, in Philpott v. Essex
County Welfare Board. 36 Philpott involved a New Jersey law
requiring state old-age assistance applicants to agree to reimburse the State for any disability advances they receive. 37
This statute enabled the state welfare board to obtain reimbursement from the recipient's subsequently discovered or
acquired property.38 When the recipient in Philpott was approved to receive Social Security benefits, the State attached
the beneficiary's bank account to recoup state funds previously
disbursed. 39
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state could not sue a
beneficiary for Social Security funds despite the beneficiary's
reimbursement agreement. 40 The Supreme Court reasoned
that the language of the SSANP "on its face" prohibits the
state from reaching the Social Security payments made to the
beneficiary by barring any "legal process.,,41 The Court found

New York's attempt to use insanity acquittees' Social Security benefits to defray
costs of institutional care); Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 322 (2nd Cir. 1990)
(appellate court reviewing procedure in which state acts as representative payee
for insanity acquittees in order to secure reimbursement of patients' costs for
care).
36. Philpott v. Essex Co. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
37. [d. at 414 n.2. The New Jersey statute provided:
Every county welfare board shall require, as a
condition to granting assistance in any case, that all or
any part of the property, either real or personal, of a
person applying for old age assistance, be pledged to said
county welfare board as a guaranty for the reimbursement
of the funds so granted as old age assistance pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter. The county welfare board
shall take from each applicant a properly acknowledged
agreement to reimburse for all advances granted, and
pursuant to such agreement, said applicant shall assign to
the welfare board, as collateral security for such advances,
all or any part of his personal property as the board shall
specify.
N.J. STAT ANN. § 44:7-14(a) (West Supp. 1972-73).
38. Philpott, 409 U.S. at 414-15.
39. [d.

40. [d. at 415-16.
41. [d. at 415.
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that the suit brought by the state to take Philpott's Social
Security benefits was "legal process" as defined by the SSANP,
and as such, was prohibited by the SSANp.'2
Fifteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the
issue in Bennett v. Arkansas. 43 The Supreme Court found a
"clear inconsistency" between the SSANP and an Arkansas
statute authorizing the state to seize prisoners' Social Security
benefits to pay for the cost of incarceration. 44 The Arkansas
Supreme Court previously had upheld the statute, finding an
implied exception to the SSANP's exemption from legal process
when a state provides for the care and maintenance of a Social
Security beneficiary.45 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that it was "the clear intent of Congress
that Social Security benefits not be attachable."46 The U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that, in view of this "inconsistency,"
the Supremacy Clause required that the state statute be overruled. 47
Since Bennett, the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided
another case based on the SSANP. 48 As a result, the rule of
the SSANP, as defined in Bennett and Philpott, is that a
recipient's benefits may not be taken without his or her consent.49 However, this does not mean that this area of law has
been completely defined. 50 Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have found that an implied exception to the SSANP's
nonassignment language exists. 51

42. ld. at 416.
43. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
44. ld. at 397. See also State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement
Act. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-1701 (West Supp. 1985) This statute was found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397.
45. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397.
46. ld. at 398.
47. ld. at 397 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.).
48. See 94 SHEPARD'S!MCGRAw-HILL, INC., SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS
AND COURT RULES No. 13 (Semiannual Cum. SUpp. 1995) and 94
SHEPARD'S!MCGRAw-HILL, INC., SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS AND COURT
RULES-PART 2 No. 21 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
49. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415, and Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397-98. See also
supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
51. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d
828, 832 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding implied exception to SSANP) and Citronelle-Mo-
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3. The Implied Exception Approach
An implied exception is an exclusion that is unexpressed
but understood by implication or necessary deduction from the
circumstances. 52 Courts that have found an implied exception
to the SSANP's language hold that in certain circumstances
the SSANP does not prohibit the unconsented taking of a
recipient's benefits. 53 This subsection will discuss the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits' use of an implied exception approach to
the SSANP.

a. The Fifth Circuit
In 1980, after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Philpott,
but before the Bennett decision, the Fifth Circuit used an implied exception approach in Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis. 54 The case involved the State of Florida seeking reimbursement from an adjudicated incompetent

bile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
there is implied exception to SSANP). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) the Fifth Circuit, in
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 830-32
(5th Cir. 1980), held that under certain circumstances a state could take a
recipient's Social Security benefits without his or her consent. Eight years later
the Supreme Court decided Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988). Since
Bennett, the Fifth Circuit has not decided another case based on 42 U.S.C. §
407(a). Thus, it is unclear whether the Fifth Circuit will use a different "implied
exception" approach than used in Davis, or whether the Bennett case will end such
use in future Fifth Circuit cases that deal with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). However, it is
clear that the Eleventh Circuit still follows such an "implied exception" approach.
The Eleventh Circuit followed such an approach when it decided Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir. 1991), three years after the decision in Bennett. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text for more information
regarding Davis and Watkins.
52. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M.A., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 679 (5th ed.
1979) (implied: The word is used in law in contrast to "express"; i.e., where the
intention in regard to the subject-matter is not manifested by explicit and direct
words, but is gathered by implication or necessary deduction from the circumstances, the general language, or the conduct of the parties.).
53. See, e.g., Department of Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828,
830-32 (5th Cir. 1980) and Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180,
1192 (11th Cir. 1991).
54. 616 F.2d 828, 830-32 (5th Cir. 1980).
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for whom the state had cared for over four years. 55 The state
expended approximately $12,000 to care for the defendant
while the defendant's guardian had accumulated over $40,000
on his behalf in Social Security and Veterans' benefits. 56 The
district court hearing the case found that the SSANP barred
the state from taking the recipient's funds. 57 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed. 58
The Fifth Circuit created an implied exception to the
SSANP, reasoning that the SSANP does not serve its intended
purpose when a beneficiary has sufficient funds for his or her
support. 59 In distinguishing Davis from Philpott, the court
noted that in Davis the state provided for all of the recipient's
needs, while in Philpott the state provided for only part of a
recipient's needs. 60 The Davis court then held that the State
could take Social Security benefits as reimbursement for care
costs provided to a beneficiary as long as the State is providing
for all of his or her needs. 61
However, the Davis case's precedential value is questionable in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Bennett,
eight years after Davis. 62 The Supreme Court discredited the
Fifth Circuit's approach in Davis of distinguishing itself on
factual grounds from the precedent of Philpott.63 The Supreme
Court referred to the Davis reasoning and stated that it did
not "think such a distinction carries the day given the express
language of [the SSANP].,,64 By this statement, the Supreme
Court clearly disapproved of the Fifth Circuit's implied exception approach. 65 Thus, according to Bennett, an implied exception approach to the SSANP may not be based on the fact that

55. Id. at 829.
56.Id.
57. Id.
58.Id.
59. Davis, 616 F.2d at 830-32.
60. Id. at 830.
61. Id. 830-32.
62. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 398 (1988).
63.Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the party seeking the beneficiary's funds provides for all of the
beneficiary's needs. 66

b. The Eleventh Circuit
In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit declared that it had "implied
an exception to [the SSANP] when the reaching of Social Security benefits is not going to impair the ability of the recipient
to satisfy his or her basic needs." 67The case, Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering v. Watkins, involved a judgment debtor who had sole
control of corporate assets totaling over $10,000,000. 68 This
debtor argued that his $2,826 in Social Security funds, which
was deposited into an account with tens of thousands of other
dollars, was protected by the SSANP from garnishment. 69
The Eleventh Circuit applied the implied exception approach to these facts and held that the SSANP did not prevent
garnishment of the recipient's benefits. 70 The court found that
the amount of Social Security funds as compared to the
appellant's total assets meant that the garnishment of these
benefits would "not mean the difference between desperation
and subsistence."7l The garnishment of these funds would not
impair the appellant's ability to satisfy his basic needs, and
therefore they could be taken without his consent.72
In creating its implied exception, the Eleventh Circuit
relied on its previous definition of the purpose of the SSANP
as "insur[ing] that recipients have the resources necessary to
meet their most basic needs."73 The Watkins court also cited
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Davis for support, which was to

66. Id. at 397-98.
67. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir.
1991). See also United States v. Devall, 704 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1983)
(purpose of § 407 is insuring that recipients have the resources to meet their most
basic needs).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.Id.
71. Id.
72. Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192.
73. Id. (citing Devall, 704 F.2d at 1516-17).
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distinguish Philpott on factual grounds. 74 Additionally,
Watkins relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Davis, noting
that neither the purpose of Social Security benefits nor the
purpose of the SSANP is accomplished by protecting a
recipient's benefits when they are not needed for his or her
care and maintenance. 75
In sum, the general rule of the SSANP, as stated in the
statute itself and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bennett, is
that it unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social
Security benefits. 76 The Fifth Circuit's implied exception approach is no longer valid since the Supreme Court has discredited the Davis court's reasoning supporting an implied exception when a state provides for all of a recipient's needs. 77
However, Davis retains some importance since the Eleventh
Circuit adopted its reasoning that a strict application of the
SSANP does not always serve the intended purposes of Social
Security benefits or the SSANP itself.78 The Eleventh Circuit's
implied exception approach may be distinguished from the
defunct Fifth Circuit's because it is based on whether the recipient has sufficient funds for care, and not on whether the
state has provided for all of the recipient's needs. 79

74. [d. In Watkins, the appellant cited four cases to support his claim that §
407 bars the state from reaching his Social Security funds. [d. The court distinguished these cases: Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614, 615 (4th Cir. 1982) (Social
Security as only income for widow); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 51 (3d Cir.
1980) (68 year old widow's sole source of income from Social Security); Tidwell v.
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1982) (institutionalized mental patients
Social Security benefits automatically paid to the state); and Philpott v. Essex
County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (state seeking reimbursement from Social
Security recipient who had no other income), on the factual basis that these cases
dealt with recipients who needed the funds, and the present case in which recipient had enough funds to keep him from "desperation and subsistence." Thus, such
a factual finding becomes very important in cases based on § 407 in the Eleventh
Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit did not mention the holding of Bennett in its analysis of the issue. The Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the Davis approach of distinguishing Philpott on factual grounds may have been due to the appellant's failure
to cite Bennett in his brief. Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92.
75. [d. at 1192.
76. See Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. §
407(a).
77. See Bennett, 485 U.S. at 398; see also Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828, 830-32 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. See Citronelle-Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir.
1991).
79. Id.; Compare Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192 (exception applies when "the
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Crawford v. Gould,80 the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether California's procedure for taking Social Security funds
from institutionalized patients was inconsistent with the
SSANP.81 The Ninth Circuit held that Social Security benefits
are exempt from any legal process. 82 The court then concluded
that California's procedure was "other legal process" as defined
by the SSANP, and found that the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution required the invalidation of the state procedure due to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bennett. 83
A. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

The Ninth Circuit primarily reviewed whether the process
California used to deduct Social Security benefits from certain
patients' hospital accounts conflicted with the SSANP. 84 If the
court found such a conflict, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution would require the invalidation of the California
procedure. 85
The Crawford court's analysis focused on two cases. 86 In
Bennett v. Arkansas, the U.S. Supreme Court held an Arkansas statute invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it
conflicted with federal law. 87 In the second case, Brinkman v.
Rahm, the Ninth Circuit struck down Washington State's procedure for deducting payments from involuntarily hospitalized

reaching of Social Security benefits is not going to impair the ability of the recipient to satisfy his or her basic needs.") with Davis, 616 F.2d at 830-32 (exception
applies if a state provides all of the care and maintenance for a Social Security
beneficiary).
80. 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 1165.
82. Id. at 1167.
83. Id. at 1165-67.
84. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67. See supra note 28 for full text of statute.
85. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165; U.S. CONST. art. VI.
86. Crawford. 56 F.3d at 1165-67 (citing Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395
(1988) and Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1989».
87. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397-98. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that, under
Bennett, no implied exception exists to the SSANP allowing attachment simply
because the state provides the recipient with all of his needed care and maintenance. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165 (citing Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397).
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patients' hospital accounts. ss In Brinkman, the Washington
patients' accounts contained deposited Social Security benefits. 89 The Ninth Circuit held that the SSANP's language protecting Social Security benefits from legal process preempted
the Washington procedure and struck down the Washington
statute. 90
Comparing California's procedure to Washington's, as
analyzed in Brinkman, the Ninth Circuit focused on the similarity of the two states' practices. 91 For example, like Washington, California withdraws money from involuntarily institutionalized patients' hospital accounts to pay for the costs of
their care. 92 This money includes patients' Social Security
benefits.93 In Crawford, California argued that its procedure
was distinguishable because it asked patients to sign an "Authorization for Deposit and Withdrawal" before withdrawing
any funds, whereas Washington merely gave notice before
deducting Social Security funds. 94
The Ninth Circuit rejected this distinction for two reasons. 95 First, California did not inform patients of their option
to refuse to apply Social Security benefits to pay for care
costS. 96 Next, California deducted patients' Social Security
funds even if the patients had not signed the "Authorization
for Deposit and Withdrawal" form.97 As a result, the Washington and California procedures were substantively the same in
that both deducted funds from patients' accounts after provid-

88. Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 264 (9th Cir. 1989). Involuntarily committed patients in the state of Washington were held responsible for their care
costs. The state withdrew funds from patients hospital accounts, which included
Social Security benefits, to pay for these costs of care. A Washington state form
entitled "Notice and Finding of Responsibility" set forth patients' liability and explained that it would apply Social Security benefits to their care costs. Crawford,
56 F.3d at 1165 (citing Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264).
89. [d. at 1165-66 (citing Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264).
90. Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 263 (relying on Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395
(1988) (per curiam)).
91. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-66.
92. [d. at 1165.
93. [d.
94. [d. at 1165-66.
95. [d. at 1166.

96. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166.
97. [d.
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ing minimal notice and without obtaining patients' meaningful
consent. 98 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the similarities
between the Washington and California procedures meant that
California's procedures were inconsistent with, and thus preempted by, the SSANP. 99
California also argued that the Washington case alone was
not dispositive regarding preemption. loo As a result, California insisted that the Ninth Circuit was required to apply the
Brinkman preemption analysis to the Crawford facts. 101
Quoting Bennett, the court held that "[the SSANP] rules out
any attempt to attach Social Security benefits", even when the
benefits would be used to pay the costs of caring for an institutionalized individuap02 Washington's procedures fell into the
category of "other legal process" specifically prohibited by the
SSANP. 103 This led the court's conclusion that since
California's procedures were comparable, they likewise constituted "other legal process."l04 Thus, regardless of Brinkman,
the SSANP's language protecting benefits from "other legal
process" would require invalidation of California's procedure. l05
The State argued that, since it never threatened to use
judicial process to collect Social Security benefits, it could not
have violated the SSANP's protection against "other legal process.,,106 California attempted to distinguish itself from the
Washington procedure which threatened patients with judicial

98. Id.
99. Id. See Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 263, for an in-depth explanation of the
Washington State procedure.
100. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166.
106. Id. The inconsistency between the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and
California's procedure arises from § 407's language which exempts Social Security
benefits from "other legal process." Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit held in Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 263 that
Washington's procedure was in conflict with the "other legal process" language.
Because California's procedure was similar to Washington's, the Ninth Circuit also
found it in conflict with the "other legal process" language. Crawford, 56 F.3d at
1165-66.
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proceedings if their debts were not paid. 107 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, holding that judicial proceedings were
not the only sort of legal process prohibited by the SSANP. 108
The Ninth Circuit concluded that California's practice of withdrawing Social Security benefits from patients' accounts without consent was within the meaning of "other legal process.,,109 In addition, the court found that Congress intended
the SSANP to "protect Social Security beneficiaries and their
dependents from the claims of creditors."l1o Thus, the court,
consistent with Congressional intent, found California's procedure in conflict with the SSANP's "other legal process" language. 111
Finally, California argued that Brinkman does not require
the state to obtain consent prior to deducting Social Security
benefits.112 Rather, the state need only provide patients with
notice of the deductions made. 113 However, the Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument on two grounds. 114 First, the court
pointed out that it had enjoined Washington from seizing the
plaintiffs' Social Security funds in Brinkman. 115 The injunction necessarily suggested that a state could not deduct Social
Security benefits even after giving patients notice. 11s Next,
the court pointed out that California's argument was incon-

107. [d. at 1166.
108. [d.
109. [d.

110. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166 (quoting from Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d
322, 327 (2nd Cir. 1990». The Ninth Circuit also distinguished Fetterusso, which
upheld a New York state process of deducting costs for care from involuntarily
institutionalized patient accounts which contained Social Security benefits. The
cases would be distinguished, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, because the finding in
Fetterusso was that patients had voluntarily agreed to use Social Security benefits
to pay for the cost of their care. This was demonstrably different from Crawford
in which plaintiffs had clearly shown they did not consent to the California procedure. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1166-67.
111. [d. at 1166.
112. [d. at 1167.
113. [d. The basis of this argument was the relief ordered in Brinkman. In
Brinkman, the Ninth Circuit ordered the State of Washington "to provide notice to
the plaintiffs of defendants' seizure of their funds, adequate notice of any exemptions . . . and adequate notice of how to exercise those exemptions." Crawford, 56
F.3d at 1167 (quoting Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 266).
114. [d.
115. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1167.
116. [d.
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sistent with the court's holding in Brinkman that the SSANP
preempted Washington's administrative process. ll7 The Ninth
Circuit found California's argument unpersuasive due to these
oversights. 118
In concluding its analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that it
had not evaluated the wisdom of exempting Social Security
benefits from payment for services when a state provides a
beneficiary with care and maintenance. 119 Rather, the Ninth
Circuit stated that it merely followed the Supreme Court's
holding in Bennett and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Congressional intent regarding the SSANP. 120
B. CONCURRENCE
Judge Trott agreed with the majority's analysis and conclusion that the SSANP preempted California's process, applying the holdings of Bennett and Brinkman. 121 However, in a
concurring opinion, he argued that the end result of the holding seemed "nonsensical" from a policy point of view. 122
To illustrate this conclusion, Judge Trott pointed out that
under this holding, while a state provides for a hospitalized
patient's necessities, it cannot obtain reimbursement from the
patient's funds if he or she resists. 123 Judge Trott concluded
"Thus, a recalcitrant patient receiving Social Security payments could pile up in about ten years an untouchable bank

117. [d.
118. See id.
119. [d.
120. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1167-68. See generally IB JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE en 0.401-0.403 (2d ed. 1985) (stare decisis); Powell,
Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990); Strauss,
Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991); Traynor,
Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HAsTINGS L.J. 1025 (1978).
121. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1995). The concurrence
stated that "[ulnder these circumstances, permitting the state to say, as it does,
that taking money from people who don't want to give it up is not 'legal process'
sounds too much like a construction out of Bleak House, or the parchment stuff
that animated Dick the Butcher in Henry the Sixth, part 2." [d.
122. [d.
123. [d.
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account of $250,000 while requiring taxpayers to foot the bill
for the costs of his hospitalization."124
While Judge Trott thought that California's desire to obtain reimbursement from these patients may be "palatable," he
objected to the state's procedure to achieve this end. 125 The
concurrence instead suggested that California should seek its
remedy through Congress, not the courts. 126
V. CRITIQUE
The Ninth Circuit outlined a clear approach to resolving
conflicts between a state procedure taking Social Security
benefits and the SSANP. 127 According to Crawford, "Absent
consent, a state has no valid means of obtaining an institutionalized person's Social Security benefits."128 The Ninth Circuit
adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning that the SSANP
"unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits."129
Two aspects of the holding in Crawford merit analysis. As
Judge Trott recognized, applying the holding can cause situations that appear "nonsensical.,,13o In addition, the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Crawford contrasts with the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Watkins. l3l
A. JunGE TROTT'S HYPOTHETICAL PATIENT

To support his opinion, Judge Trott created a hypothetical
patient who could "pile up" an untouchable $250,000 in benefits while institutionalized. 132 Situations similar to Judge
Trott's hypothetical have been adjudicated with similar re-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169.
See Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 1165 (citing Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397).
Id. at 1169.
See generally Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165; Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192.
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169.
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sultS. 133 For example, case law constrains the State of Missouri from threatening insanity acquittees' representative
payees with legal action to reach Social Security benefits. 134
The State attempted to reach these benefits to pay for the
acquittees' care. 135 In New York, the State may not use court
proceedings to force insanity acquittees' representative payees
to use the acquittees' Social Security funds for care costs. 136
In addition, the United States Supreme Court restricted Arkansas from taking Social Security benefits from prisoners to
pay for the costs of incarceration. 137
Regarding California's procedure, Judge Trott admitted
that the justification for "permitting a patient to "pile up ...
an untouchable bank account ... while requiring taxpayers to
foot the bill" escaped him, being that it "hardly seems consistent with the purpose of the Social Security Act."138 By stating that "[w]e do not determine the wisdom of exempting Social Security benefits from legal process when the state provided the beneficiary with care and maintenance,"139 the majority opinion indicated that the panel chose not to analyze the potential results of its ruling.140 The Ninth Circuit distanced
itself from the logic of its result by holding that it was "constrained to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congressional intent with respect to [the SSANp].,,14l
The Ninth Circuit strictly applied the language and holding of Bennett rather than shaping its own implied exception to

133. See, e.g., King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the term "other legal process" includes threat of legal process, and thus
state's action was in violation of § 407) cert. denied 502 U.S. 1095 (1991);
Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 71, 74 (2nd Cir. 1991) (acquittees' payees, who
had amassed Social Security payments of $48,776.33 and $18,114.86, could not be
forced by special proceeding available under New York law to pay these funds
towards recipients' care costs).
134. See Schafer, 940 F.2d at 1185 (the term "other legal process" includes
threat of legal process, and thus state's act of threatening to bring legal action
was in violation of § 407).
135. [d.
136. See Katz, 909 F.2d at 71, 74.
137. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1988) (per curiam).
138. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169.
139. [d. at 1167.
140. See id.
141. [d. at 1167-68.
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the SSANP, as the Eleventh Circuit had done. 142 Crawford's
holding does not include an implied exception despite the fact
that an exception might prevent some of these "nonsensical"
results. l43 Applying the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Watkins
to Judge Trott's hypothetical demonstrates that the results
would be quite different. 144

Watkins implies an exception to the SSANP if a state, by
reaching Social Security benefits, does not impair the ability of
the recipient to satisfy his or her basic needs. l45 Judge Trott's
hypothetical has a patient earning as much as $250,000 over
ten years of institutionalization. l46 Under the Eleventh Circuit approach, the state could gain access to a large portion of
these funds to cover a recipient's care costs since such a large
amount of money is more than enough to satisfy a recipient's
basic needs. 147 This approach to SSANP law does not appear
to conflict with the Social Security system's purpose of protecting a worker and his family from 10SS.I46 Under the Eleventh
Circuit approach, institutionalized patients could not accumulate massive funds in untouchable bank accounts, thereby
forcing taxpayers to pay for their care. 149

142. Id. at 1167. Compare Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-68 (following reasoning of
Bennett, that the SSANP unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social
Security benefits) with Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180 (11th Circuit has an implied exception to the SSANP).
143. See Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169. ("nonsensical" refers to Judge Trott's concurrence when he points out that a patient could acquire an untouchable bank
account of $250,000 while requiring taxpayers to pay the bill for his or her care).
Compare Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169 with Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192, (attempted
protection of funds by recipient millionaire termed "almost ridiculous," and § 407
thus not applied).
144. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192; see also notes 67-75 and accompanying
text.
145. Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192.
146. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169.
147. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. Compare rule of Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192
(Eleventh Circuit has an implied exception to § 407 when reaching of Social Security benefits will not impair ability of recipient to satisfy basic needs) with
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169 (Judge Trott's hypothetical patient).
148. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192.
149. Id. See also Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1169.
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SPLIT BETWEEN THE NINTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS

In a case unrelated to SSANP law, Judge Trott gave an
example of the effect of a split between the circuits. l50 In that
case, the Ninth Circuit attempted to interpret the Congressional intent for a statute which several Circuits had interpreted
inconsistently.151 In referring to the several splits, Trott said:
Imagine what we would say if Congress had
enacted this law: Eligibility for 121(c) relief
ceases (1) in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, when a deportation
order becomes administratively final; (2) in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, when the order to
show cause is issued; (3) in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern
Mariana Islands, when the Board may no longer
reconsider or reopen the case; (4) in Connecticut,
New York and Vermont, under a rule which is
different from the rule in Louisiana, Mississippi,
Texas, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin but not
clearly stated; and (5) elsewhere, depending on
the option chosen by the judges of the U.S.
Courts of Appeal. 152

Uniform application of federal law across geographic and
circuit boundaries is essential. 153 Fortunately, the functionality of our judicial system allows one Supreme Court to clarify a
statute which has been interpreted inconsistently among the

150. See Nairn Butros v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
990 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1144-46.
152. Id. at 1152.
153. Id. at 1149.
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circuits. 1M However, this purpose cannot be served if, after
the Supreme Court rules, circuits independently find exceptions to interpreted statutes. 155
One of the important purposes for the Supreme Court
having supreme power over federal law is to establish a sole
interpreter and decision-maker whose holdings provide uniformity throughout the states. 1S6 Whether the Supreme Court is
correct in its interpretation of a law or of Congressional intent
is irrelevant. 157 As Supreme Court Justice Jackson eloquently
said, "[t]here is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme
Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals . . . would also
be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final.,,158
Interpreting the SSANP, the Supreme Court has spoken
clearly.159 The SSANP "unambiguously rules out any attempt
to attach Social Security benefits."16o The Supreme Court also
defined Congressional intent in enacting the SSANP, stating
154. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III §§ 1, 2 ("The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. VI
("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.")
155. See, e.g., Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192, and Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67,
demonstrating the current split between the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits regarding
42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Had the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of Bennett, as
the Ninth Circuit did, no such split would exist.
156. See generally McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 28-29 (1989) ("To secure state-court compliance with and national
uniformity of federal law, the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over cases
encompassing issues of federal law is subject to two conditions: state courts must
interpret and enforce faithfully the 'supreme law of the land', and their decisions
are subject to review by this court."); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040
(1983) (" . . . [I]t cannot be doubted that there is an important need for uniformity in federal law. . . . "); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J.
concurring) ("Since the Constitution and laws made pursuant to it create the supreme law and since the supremacy and uniformity of federal law are attainable
only by a centralized source of authority, denial by a state of a claimed right
must give some access to the federal judicial system.").
157. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 540.
158. Id.
159. See Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397.
160. [d.
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that it was "the clear intent of Congress that Social Security
benefits not be attachable."161 In Bennett, the Supreme Court
exercised its supreme power and elucidated Congressional
intent for the SSANP. 162 While the Eleventh Circuit's holding
does not directly conflict with the Supreme Court's language in
Bennett, it seems at odds with Bennett's holding and reasoning. 163 The Ninth Circuit's approach, on the other hand, follows Bennett's holding and reasoning exactly.l64
Judge Trott's concurrence explained the proper remedy to
California's situation: 165 California should seek its remedy in
Congress, not the courts; i.e., a judicially created implied exception approach is inappropriate. l66 Congress must create its
policy when passing law and ultimately Congress must decide
whether Judge Trott's hypothetical causes a nonsensical
result. 167
VI. CONCLUSION
In Crawford v. Gould, the Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court precedent in Bennett. 16B The Ninth Circuit held
that the SSANP unambiguously bars any attempt by a state to
take a recipient's Social Security benefits without his or her
consent. 169 This holding rejected the proposition that an "implied exception" to the SSANP exists when a state provides for
all of a recipient's care and maintenance. 170
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Citronelle-Mobile Gather-

161. [d. at 398.
162. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 398.
163. See Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1192. Compare Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92
(11th circuit implies an exception to the SSANP) with Bennett, 485 U.S. 396-98
(SSANP unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits)
and Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-68.
164. Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-68.
165. [d. at 1169.
166. [d.
167. See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, ("All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ").
168. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1165-68 (9th Cir. 1995).
169. [d. at 1167.
170. [d. at 1165. Compare Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988) with
Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67.
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ing v. Watkins did not follow the reasoning of Bennett.17l
Thus, there is a clear split between the Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits on the question of whether an "implied exception" to the SSANP exists. 172

The Ninth Circuit found that patients who challenged
California's procedure have a federal statutory right to refuse
to allow their Social Security benefits to be used to pay for the
costs of their care. 173 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, unless Congress acts to clarify its purpose with the SSANP, these patients will conceivably be able to "pile up" large amounts of
money without having to pay for the costs of their care. 174

Paul Webb"

171. See Citronelle·Mobile Gathering v. Watkins, 56 F.3d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir.
1991). Compare Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92 (using implied exception approach to
the SSANP) with Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397-98.
172. Compare Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67 with Watkins, 934 F.2d at 1191-92.
173. See Crawford, 56 F.3d at 1165-67.
174. Id. at 1169. The Ninth Circuit did not address other possible procedures of
obtaining payment from the plaintiff patients. See generally King v. Schafer, 940
F.2d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 1991) (department of Mental Health's application to
serve as patients' representative payee is not "other legal process" as defined by §
407(a)); Kreigbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 71, 74 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.2050 the Social Security Administration alone has the power to appoint a new representative payee if the current payee does not use payments on beneficiary's behalf); Woodall v. Bartolino, 700 F.Supp. 210, 216-21
(D.N.J. 1985) (stating that failure of a representative payee to apply funds to the
costs of care and maintenance of an institutionalized individual may result in
removing the representative payee and, perhaps, naming as payee the institution
caring for the patient); see also Matter of Vary's Estate, 258 N.W. 2d 11, 17-19
(1977) (protection of § 407 ends at recipient's death).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997.
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